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THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY’S CANADIAN 
ENTITLEMENT: THE ROLE OF LIBERALIZED 
AND INTEGRATED NORTH AMERICAN 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN A NEW 
CALCULATION 
Kevin Kirkpatrick 
ABSTRACT: The Columbia River Treaty between the United States and 
Canada may be terminated unilaterally by either nation beginning next year; 
this has brough attention within the Pacific Northwest and beyond to the 1964 
agreement on river flows. Much of the discussion about updating the accord 
highlights important goals such as bettering the protection of fish and increasing 
public participation in ecosystem governance, but often neglects analysis of how 
electricity markets have changed over the past fifty years. This Comment, 
through an examination of key developments in utilities law and application of 
economic theory, attempts to parse principles that may prove helpful in finding a 
solution to the agreement’s most contentious element—the “Canadian 
Entitlement” payments from the U.S. to British Columbia—from the puzzle of 
the Columbia River Treaty’s electricity piece. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, the U.S. and Canada put into force the Columbia 
River Treaty (Treaty) to coordinate hydroelectric power 
320 
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generation and flood control on the largest river flowing 
through the Pacific Northwest.1 The Treaty increasingly draws 
the attention of legal scholars both because it can be 
unilaterally terminated by either nation as soon as 2014 and 
because many regard its focus as too narrow to accurately 
reflect how North American rivers are now managed.2 
Commentators in the fields of law and policy have pointed out 
that the regulatory regime governing the Columbia has 
changed greatly since the TREATY took effect and have 
argued that any new agreement needs to consider 
environmental goals as well as governance arrangements that 
were not in place in the 1960s.3 On the American side of the 
49th Parallel, for instance, transformative federal laws like the 
Endangered Species Act and Northwest Power Act did not 
even come into existence until years after Treaty ratification.4 
Much less scholarship is available, however, about another 
important regulatory trend that during the past half-century 
reshaped the North American utilities industry: the 
integration and liberalization5 of American and Canadian 
wholesale electricity markets. This Comment begins to fill that 
gap, arguing that keeping in mind changes to both the physical 
and legal infrastructure of power supply in the U.S. and 
Canada in the past half-century is important to addressing one 
1. Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada Relating to 
Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, U.S.-
Can., Sept. 16, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1555 [hereinafter Treaty]; FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER 
POWER SYSTEM (BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
AND U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS), THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM INSIDE STORY 4 
(2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM]. 
2. See, e.g., Nigel Bankes, The Flood Control Regime of the Columbia River Treaty: 
Before and After 2024, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2012). 
3. See, e.g., Rachael Paschal Osborn, Climate Change and the Columbia River 
Treaty, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 75, 78-79 (2012). 
4. A. Paul Firuz, Looking Forward: The Columbia River Treaty, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 170 (2012). 
5. The term “liberalization” is used here, though “restructuring” is another word that 
appears in some scholarship referring to the same general lessening government 
control in a specific sector of the economy in favor of more market-oriented approaches. 
In the U.S. and Canadian power and utilities industries, “deregulation” is more 
common than either “liberalization” or “restructuring” but it is not used 
interchangeably with those two words in this Comment since “deregulation” does not 
necessarily encompass related changes like free trade agreements that “liberalization” 
does. “Liberalization” for the purposes of this Comment, however, does not include 
privatization, though that is a connotation that sometimes comes with the word in the 
U.K. 
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of the Treaty’s most thorny issues, the calculation of the 
“Canadian Entitlement” downstream power benefits paid each 
year to British Columbia by the U.S. 
As the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) prepare to jointly deliver to 
the U.S. Department of State a final recommendation on a new 
Treaty in December 2013,6 discussing not only what Columbia 
hydropower is worth in 2013 but why its value is so different 
from what treaty negotiators predicted in the 1960s can 
potentially help with this piece of a new agreement. Looking at 
the problem through the lens of one major trend in utilities law 
lends support to some of the principles laid out by the BPA and 
USACE in their draft recommendation while underscoring the 
fact that continuing an inflexible and un-adaptable calculation 
is unlikely to help the price tag of a new agreement 
approximate the reality of its rewards over the long term. 
II. HISTORY: HOW THE TREATY CAME TO BE 
Detailed, well-written accounts of the origins, operations, 
and governance of the Treaty system are readily available 
elsewhere7 so this Comment will strive to be brief in orienting 
the reader with the system’s historical, physical, and legal 
dimensions. Still, a few pertinent points about the Treaty’s 
origins and how it functions today bear mention here. 
Many identify the 1948 catastrophic flooding of the riverside 
cities of Vanport, Oregon and Trail, British Columbia as a 
primary catalyst for the creation of the Treaty.8 Others draw 
6. U.S. Entity (Bonneville Power Administration and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
[hereinafter U.S. Entity]), Columbia River Treaty Review Working Draft of a Regional 
Recommendation: Improving the Columbia River Treaty, June 27, 2013, available at 
http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/CRTR%20working%20draft%20 
recommendation,%20June%2027%202013.pdf; U.S. Entity, Sept. 20, 2013, Columbia 
River Treaty Review Draft Regional Recommendation, available at http://www.crt2014-
2024review.gov/DraftRegionalRecommendation.aspx. 
7. See generally, e.g., Paul W. Hirt and Adam M. Sowards, The Past and Future of 
the Columbia River 115; Jeremy Mouat, The Columbia Exchange: A Canadian 
Perspective on the Negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, 1944-1964, in THE 
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED: TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER GOVERNANCE IN THE 
FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 14 (Barbara Cosens ed., 2012) [hereinafter THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER TREATY REVISITED]. 
8. See, e.g., James D. Barton and Kelvin Ketchum, The Columbia River Treaty: 
Managing for Uncertainty, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, 
at 43. 
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attention to the strong interest of the U.S. in the 1950s and 
1960s in developing a large hydroelectric dam in Libby, 
Montana and its corresponding need for Canadian consent to 
create a trans-border reservoir and interfere with BC Hydro’s 
plans to divert part of the Columbia into the Fraser River.9 
Still others emphasize that, at the time of Treaty negotiations, 
the Social Credit government of British Columbia Premier 
W.A.C. Bennett was seeking to build dams on several 
tributaries of the Columbia but lacked the capital to start 
those projects. Unable to secure that funding in Canada, 
according to this analysis, Bennett in effect used the Treaty as 
a means of gaining access to American government financing 
when the U.S. prepaid the estimated present value of the first 
thirty years of Canada’s share of the downstream power 
benefits.10 
Regardless of the precise historical causes of the Treaty’s 
creation, it was signed in 1961 and took effect following 
ratification in 1964. 
A. Structures: What the Treaty Built and Why 
There are four dams that were constructed through the 
Treaty—Duncan, Keenleyside/Arrow, and Mica in British 
Columbia, plus Libby in Montana—and each was built mostly 
for storage rather than on-site electricity generation.11 The 
dams have always been capable of generating electricity but 
their intended primary function at the time of construction 
was to hold water so that the Columbia’s flow could be 
controlled to better synchronize demand for electricity with 
power generation at other facilities downstream.12 Electricity 
is not like many other commodities in that it cannot easily be 
stored for future use even though its reliability is evidently 
essential to the functioning of an industrialized society and 
9. A. Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters 
an Equitable Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y at 523, 529-30 
(2007). 
10. John Shurts, Rethinking the Columbia River Treaty, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER 
TREATY REVISITED supra note 7, at 194. 
11. Id. at 196. 
12. Richard White, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER 
77 (1995). 
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economy.13 An estimated 45 percent of the Columbia’s present 
storage comes from water held back by the four “Treaty dams”; 
without them, there would be a mismatch between when the 
Columbia’s flow naturally peaks in late spring and the winter 
months when demand for electricity (and by extension water 
flowing through hydroelectric dams) is at its highest in the 
Pacific Northwest.14 
B. Stakeholders and Governance: Who Decides How the 
Columbia is Managed? 
The four Treaty dams were added to a river already being 
used by other humans. The people and organizations who are 
affected by the Columbia but who were not invited to 
participate in Treaty negotiations have gained influence on its 
governance through several subsequent federal, state, and 
provincial acts but they are still officially not parties to the 
Treaty.15 Tribes who historically fished on the river, farmers 
who rely heavily on its water for irrigation and transportation 
of crops, the American and Canadian towns located near the 
Columbia’s banks, and—importantly for a comment about the 
electricity industry—owners of non-Treaty dams, have no real 
seat at the table alongside the official Treaty “Entities” of BC 
Hydro, USACE, and BPA designated by the American and 
Canadian federal governments.16 Several commentators have 
noted the absence of a public process in the Treaty system’s 
governance configuration as something that needs revision to 
conform to contemporary ideas about fairness and democratic 
process.17 Other observers, not necessarily disagreeing with 
such calls for change, have pointed out that the Treaty’s 
origins—in an era when concerns about environmental and 
social impacts were considerably different than they are 
13. Leonard S., Andrew S., and Richard C. Hyman, AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 26 (2000). 
14. Shurts, supra note 10, at 197. 
15. Barbara Cosens, Changes in Empowerment: Rising Voices in Columbia Basin 
Resource Management, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 
61. 
16. See Figure 1, Anthony G. White, The Columbia River: Operation Under the 1964 
Treaty, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
17. See, e.g., Eve Vogel, Can an International Treaty Strengthen a Region and 
Further Social and Environmental Inclusion? Lessons from the Columbia River Treaty, 
in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 281, 290. 
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today—likely enabled the creation of a system that would 
probably not prove feasible in 2013.18 
Members of the official Entities counter claims that they do 
not give enough voice to non-official parties by noting that 
BPA, USACE, and BC Hydro are all public agencies that have 
already incorporated many concerns into Treaty operations; 
the system is not operated or governed in 2013 exactly as it 
was in 1964.19 Indeed, although only BC Hydro, USACE, and 
the BPA are Treaty entities with ultimate decision-making 
authority, several other international and domestic 
agreements—namely the Pacific Northwest Coordination Act 
and the Northwest Power Act in the U.S. and the Columbia 
Basin Trust Act in British Columbia—give influence to non-
Entity groups and may lend them a role in shaping any 
changes to a downstream hydropower benefits recalculation.20 
The scope of this Comment, focused on that benefits 
recalculation, does not allow for a direct discussion of most of 
the Treaty system’s “non-official” stakeholders or how they 
should or should not be included in ongoing decision-making 
other than to note their presence and underline that within the 
hydropower industry, the Treaty dams were neither the first 
nor the largest on the Columbia.21 
III. IS THE TREATY BROKEN? IF SO, WHAT ARE THE 
OPTIONS TO FIX IT? 
Not everyone agrees that the Treaty system as it currently 
exists needs fixing. Some argue that though the Treaty itself 
deals only with power and floods, the U.S. and Canadian 
Treaty Entities have over the years together developed a 
complex international scheme of subsequent protocols and 
operating agreements that address goals like fish protection.22 
18. I.e., “The United States and Canada would never negotiate this particular treaty 
today,” Shurts, supra note 10, at 226. 
19. See Anthony G. White, supra note 16, at 59. 
20. See Vogel, supra note 17, at 290. 
21. The first hydroelectric project on the river was Rock Island Dam near 
Wenatchee. Completed in 1933, it is owned and operated by the Chelan County Public 
Utilities District. The largest in terms of generating capacity is Grand Coulee Dam, 
opened in 1941 by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation with a capacity of 6,809 rate 
megawatts. See Anthony G. White, supra note 16, at 56. 
22. I.e., “[M]anagement of the Columbia River is as much about international 
relations as it is about public administration within the U.S.,” Anthony G. White, 
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If the Treaty as-is largely works, this line of thinking 
continues, complete renegotiation in place of a continuing 
evolution of the river’s management through existing channels 
may ultimately end up doing more harm than good to 
consumers and producers of electricity as well as to wildlife. 
Writers in this group argue that, however imperfect the 
Treaty, it is better than what preceded it and what would 
replace it upon termination: a system for settling border 
disputes based on the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty 
supplemented by a bare bones flood control regime.23 
Many in both the electricity and wildlife camps, however, 
argue (for different reasons) that the Treaty is no longer 
workable long-term. Perhaps the most radical view is that the 
river should be returned to its natural state, but few even 
among those generally most in favor of decommissioning dams 
see widespread removal of projects on the Columbia main stem 
as a likely option given the importance of hydropower to the 
Pacific Northwest.24 As one commentator has noted, “[W]hat 
we are dealing with here is a biological river that is also a key 
component in a western North American electrical energy 
system.”25 A more pragmatic understanding of the value of fish 
vis-à-vis hydropower would not seek removal of the Columbia’s 
dams but would consider either terminating or modifying the 
Treaty and the elaborate structure of international 
coordination that developed around it. Advocates of change in 
this vein note that such an approach could also mean lower 
rates for power consumers.26 
supra note 16, at 54. 
23. Lance Dickie, Roll On With an Updated Columbia River Pact, SEATTLE TIMES, 
July 4, 2013, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2020956392_ 
columndickiecolumbiarivertreatyxml.html; Chris W. Sanderson, The Columbia River 
Treaty After 2024, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 249, 
263. 
24. Dam removal advocates in the Pacific Northwest, for example, focus mostly on 
small-scale projects, none on the Columbia main stem. See generally, Michael C. 
Blumm and Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest: Lessons for 
the Nation, 42 ENVTL. L. 1043 (2012). 
25. See Shurts, supra note 10, at 192. 
26. Annette Cary, Better Power Rates Possible for Mid-Columbia Customers if 
Columbia River Treaty Changes, TRI-CITY HERALD, 7 MAY 2013, available at http:// 
www.tri-cityherald.com/2013/05/07/2386456/better-power-rates-possible-for.html; see 
also, Editorial, Columbia River Treaty Warrants Revisions That Are Balanced, YAKIMA 
HERALD-REPUBLIC, 8 OCT. 2013, available at http://www.yakimaherald.com/news/yhr/ 
tuesday/1564629-14/columbia-river-treaty-warrants-revisions-that-are-balanced. 
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Some commentators back unilateral termination because 
they believe that getting rid of the Treaty would mean an end 
to management for electricity generation but not for flood 
control. Flood control as it currently operates will change in 
2024 but cannot be unilaterally terminated as can power 
generation; even if the Treaty ends, Canada is still obligated to 
provide “called-upon” flood benefits to the U.S.27 This stance, 
which may seem extreme at first glance, is in fact advocated by 
a group saying operations would change little. Such writers 
argue that BC Hydro may make as much or more profit by 
controlling its own dams than by getting a check from the U.S. 
and say that little will change upon termination because the 
province cannot significantly alter the way it operates Treaty 
dams without substantially impairing its own ability to 
generate the hydropower on which it has become dependent.28 
A final group seems to think that the solution is neither to 
keep the Treaty intact nor to terminate it but to craft a new 
system that better reflects social, political, and economic 
concerns of 2014 and beyond. One scholar has identified six 
means of implementing broad modification: 
A. Renegotiate the treaty 
B. Negotiate a “partner treaty” 
C. Negotiate formal amendments 
D. Negotiate and implement protocols 
E. Incorporate new “Entities” or advisors 
F. Adjust annual operating plans.29 
IV. PAYING BRITISH COLUMBIA: WHAT IS THE 
“CANADIAN ENTITLEMENT” AND HOW DOES IT 
AFFECTS A NEW TREATY? 
The Canadian Entitlement is the annual share of the 
electricity generated in the U.S. that is given back to British 
Columbia as payment for operating the Treaty dams in 
27. “[U]pon termination Canada would no longer need to store or release water from 
the projects for any purpose related to generation in the United States . . . [and] the 
United States would no longer owe Canada any share of downstream power benefits” 
but “British Columbia’s responsibility to provide ‘called upon’ flood control will remain 
even if the rest of the treaty is terminated.” See Shurts, supra note 10, at 202-03. 
28. Id. at 229. 
29. Matthew McKinney, Managing Transboundary Natural Resources: An 
Assessment of the Need to Revise and Update the Columbia River Treaty, in THE 
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 84, 92-94. 
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accordance with U.S. requirements. Or, as one pair of 
commentators phrased it in summarizing the treaty’s purpose, 
“Canada traded hypothetical lost hydroelectric generating 
capacity and surplus flood control storage for money.”30 The 
Entitlement is calculated every year, six years in advance of 
actual operations through an “Assured Operating Plan” which 
takes into account water flows as if they were being managed 
only for flood control and power generation.31 A (very) 
simplified equation is: 
Downstream power benefits = Hydroelectric generation 
in U.S. with Canadian storage – Hydroelectric 
generation in U.S. without Canadian storage32 
Canada receives half of the downstream power benefits 
determined through this calculation, a requirement that comes 
from the Treaty text.33 
It is worth emphasizing that because the basic calculation 
itself is in the Treaty, any substantial change to the 
Entitlement would probably require a new or modified Treaty, 
not just something like a supplemental operating agreement.34 
While any discussion of possible changes to the Entitlement 
calculation would need to be situated in the larger, ongoing 
conversation about what to do with the Treaty system in 2014 
anyway, the fact that the share of benefits is embedded in the 
Treaty means that revising the calculation most likely goes 
hand in hand with a major new, international agreement. 
Changing the share of benefits is not really compatible with 
only minor, “side” modifications, though the two countries have 
to date proven adept at resolving similar problems posed by 
transnational effects of hydroelectric dams in the Pacific 
Northwest without new treaties.35 
30. See Tarlock and Wouters, supra note 9, at 529. 
31. See Shurts, supra note 10, at 199-200. 
32. Id. at 198. 
33. See Treaty, supra note 1, Art. V. 
34. Shurts, supra note 10, at 225. 
35. See generally, Nigel Bankes, Environment: Garrison Dam, Columbia River, the 
IJC, NGOs, 30 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 117 (2004) (discussing resolution of the physical return 
of power to Canada despite Treaty language requiring delivery at a location that was 
unfeasible in 1998); see also, Matthew McKinney et al., Managing Transboundary 
Natural Resources: An Assessment of the Need to Revise and Update the Columbia 
River Treaty, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y at 307, 346 (2010) (discussing 
the 2000 Libby Coordination Agreement); see generally, Paul Marshall Parker, High 
Ross Dam: The International Joint Commission Takes a Hard Look at the 
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How the Entitlement fits into a renegotiation option is far 
less clear than how it is affected by scenarios of leaving the 
system as-is or discarding it entirely. If nothing about the 
Treaty is changed, the Entitlement would stay the same. If the 
Treaty terminates, the Entitlement itself would disappear 
even if operations remain substantially the same. 
Mechanically, modification options A, B, and C (above) would 
work with a new calculation while sub-options D, E, and F 
would be incompatible. But this does not answer the 
substantive question about the Entitlement: regardless of the 
form a new agreement takes, if the Treaty is reworked, how do 
the two countries decide how to split the costs? Or, as one 
writer phrased it in exploring a different question about 
change in the U.S. electricity industry, “Who pays and how 
much?”36 Focusing on the restructuring of North America’s 
electricity markets is an attempt to help tease out principles 
that may be useful in answering that question for the 
Canadian Entitlement. 
A. Does the Entitlement Calculation Still Approximate 
Shared Costs and Benefits; If Not, Why? 
Assuming that the Treaty is in some way renegotiated, 
amended, or replaced, how does one begin to determine how a 
system of shared power benefits might fit into a new 
international arrangement? One place to start is to ask if the 
existing means of determining the Entitlement still 
approximate the reality of how costs and benefits are shared 
by the U.S. and Canada on the Columbia River. Four major 
possibilities emerge from such an exercise: 
1. Despite changes in the western electricity market, 
the calculation methodology and its fifty-fifty benefit 
split still roughly reflect the reality of cost and benefit 
sharing by the two countries; the fundamentals of the 
existing calculation can be incorporated into a new, 
Environmental Consequences of Hydroelectric Power Generation—The 1982 
Supplementary Order, 58 WASH. L. REV. 445 (1983) (discussing resolution of the High 
Ross controversy without a treaty negotiated by the U.S. Department of State). 
36. Paul Vercruyssen, Renewable Energy Integration Costs: Who Pays and How 
Much?, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 181 (2011); see also, Editorial, How Much for a 
Modern Treaty?, WENATCHEE WORLD, July 3, 2013, available at http://www. 
wenatcheeworld.com/news/2013/jul/03/how-much-for-a-modern-treaty. 
                                               
10
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol3/iss2/7
330 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:2 
amended, or revised treaty; 
2. The U.S. is paying for substantially more than it is 
receiving in power and flood benefits from Canada; the 
calculation needs to be changed; 
3. The U.S. is paying for substantially less than it is 
receiving in power and flood benefits from Canada; the 
calculation needs to be changed; 
4. The U.S. is paying for less than it receives in power 
and flood benefits but is also receiving other benefits 
(such as water to spill for wildlife protection) which 
mean the Entitlement calculation approximates the 
reality of shared costs and benefits by the U.S. and 
Canada; the calculation may or may not need to be 
changed. 
Scenario 1, despite its apparent simplicity, is not without 
proponents. In the view of one Canadian commentator, the fact 
that the U.S. and Canada jointly calculate only gross benefits 
and leave the potentially more contentious net benefit 
calculation to be done individually is critical to managing the 
river; the ease of not having to haggle over the value of 
benefits makes the system work.37 In economic terms, one 
might summarize this argument by saying that comparative 
advantage38 coupled with Coasian-like bargaining39 results in 
a sort of Pareto efficiency or Nash equilibrium40 outcome 
where both sides reach their optimal balancing of costs and 
benefits.41 Each country, based on its own calculus, can 
negotiate up to the point that it is better off than it would be 
without engaging in the Treaty system. This is a view that has 
also drawn some support in the U.S. Pacific Northwest popular 
press among those arguing that the U.S. could turn out 
proverbially penny-wise and pound-foolish by terminating or 
37. Sanderson, supra note 23, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED 249, 266. 
38. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
Book IV, Ch. II (1776). 
39. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960). 
40. John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Ph.D. diss., Mathematics Dept., 
Princeton Univ. (1950). 
41. For a similar, related application of some of these principles to hydroelectricity 
trade between the U.S. and Canada, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Coase and the Control of 
Transboundary Pollution: The Sale of Hydroelectricity Under the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 279 (1991). 
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substantially reducing the Entitlement.42 
There is likely some truth in this analysis, but it is at the 
same time problematic in that it does not account for changes 
in the value of benefits that cannot be remedied through the 
use of supplemental operating agreements. From a purely 
pragmatic standpoint, too, Scenario 1 (like calls to preserve the 
Treaty as-is) does not seem prudent since it essentially takes 
the position that nothing really needs to be changed, a view 
that on the U.S. side does not appear to align with current 
thinking inside the official Entities.43 In fact, though they will 
not make an official recommendation to the U.S. State 
Department on what should be done with the Treaty until the 
end of 2013, BPA and the USACE have already publicly stated 
that there is a great mismatch between what Canada is paid in 
Entitlement energy and the net benefits the U.S. is receiving; 
they have estimated U.S. power benefits at as little as one 
tenth of what they pay through the Entitlement calculation.44 
Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 at least contemplate the possibility of a 
changed calculation. Overlaid on these is the question of 
whether a disparity between benefits and costs stems from the 
underlying methodology of the calculation used to estimate 
benefits, the split of calculated benefits, or some combination 
of the two. Stated differently, if the Entitlement calculation is 
inaccurate, is this because it arrives at a totaling of benefits 
that does not match reality or because the U.S. and Canada 
split the value of those benefits equally despite the fact that 
42. Lance Dickie, Roll On With an Updated Columbia River Pact: Update the 
Columbia River Treaty But Nurture a Plan That Provides Water, Power, Flood Control 
and Economic Opportunity For the U.S. and Canada, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2013, 
available at http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2020956392_columndickiecolumbia 
rivertreatyxml.html. 
43. I.e., BPA spokesmen Mike Hansen: “One of the things that is clear to us is that 
the value for the Canadian [E]ntitlement post-2024 is worth significantly less than 
half the current value,” in Scott Learn, Columbia River Treaty Between U.S. and 
Canada Under Intense Review, OREGONIAN, May 9, 2013, available at http://www. 
oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/04/columbia_river_treaty_between.html. 
44. U.S. ENTITY, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 2014/2024 REVIEW: CANADIAN 
ENTITLEMENT (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/ 
Columbia%20River%20Treaty%20Review%20-%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20 
Canadian%20Entitlement--FOR%20PRINT.PDF; U.S. ENTITY, COLUMBIA RIVER 
TREATY REVIEW WORKING DRAFT OF A REGIONAL RECOMMENDATION: IMPROVING THE 
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY (June 27, 2013), available at http://www.crt2014-
2024review.gov/Files/CRTR%20working%20draft%20recommendation,%20June%2027
%202013.pdf. 
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one country bears substantially more costs than the other? The 
fifty-fifty split likely contributes to the inaccuracy but is not as 
important for this Comment since a strong and relatively 
straightforward case can be made for the former cause. If the 
benefits to be divided are not correct, the division of those 
inaccurate benefits is unlikely to approximate reality. 
There is ample evidence that major assumptions underlying 
the calculation are no longer sound and that the downstream 
power benefits are much greater than those who created the 
calculation predicted they would be. John Shurts of the 
Northwest Power and Conservation Council identifies several 
such suppositions held by those who helped create the 
Entitlement calculation, several of which he argues vary vastly 
from present realities. 
First, those setting up the Entitlement calculation thought 
that the value of hydropower was expected to decrease as more 
thermal (coal and nuclear) plants were built in the Pacific 
Northwest.45 Larger, more economically efficient thermal 
plants, the thinking went, would provide an increasingly 
greater proportion of the region’s baseload power while hydro 
would eventually be phased into primarily meeting peaking 
and load-following demand.46 These thermal plants did not, 
however, materialize and as a result hydropower continues to 
form between sixty and seventy percent of the Pacific 
Northwest’s electricity supply.47 Its value remains higher than 
anticipated in large part because it continues to serve as a core 
source of power for a region rather than a source than can be 
used to supplement a cheaper base of thermal electricity.48 
Hydro still provides firm, baseload power while other, new 
power sources—natural gas and wind—are used in the Pacific 
Northwest for the non-firm peaking and load-following 
functions that Treaty drafters anticipated for hydro.49 
A second important assumption held by those who created 
the Entitlement calculation is that the Pacific Northwest’s 
electricity system, even if connected to the rest of the west to 
temporarily sell surplus power, would remain in the long run 
45. See Shurts, supra note 10, at 206. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 210; see FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 45. 
48. See Shurts, supra note 10, at 212. 
49. Id. 
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mostly isolated from the rest of North America.50 In hindsight, 
and given California’s longstanding “looming presence” over 
the U.S. Pacific Northwest in comparison to the much weaker 
intra-regional economic pulls, this may seem less 
understandable than 1960s ideas about the potential of 
nuclear power.51 Nevertheless, there is no question that a 
much larger, more integrated electricity market than that 
envisioned by Treaty framers evolved.52 
In the physical realm, the most significant change was the 
Pacific Northwest-California direct current transmission 
intertie. In Shurts’s estimation, the completion of a north-
south power interconnection was not originated by the Treaty 
but was crucially aided by it; British Columbia, Oregon, and 
Washington did not have enough population to consume the 
amount of power generated by the new capacity but California 
did.53 The Treaty served as a major catalyst in getting the 
linkage between the two Pacific regions actually built;54 it was 
part of a broader push by the American federal government 
dating to the 1930s to upgrade the U.S. grid.55 This 
interconnection in the long run has allowed the Northwest and 
the Southwest to trade their power supply with each other and 
reduce the amount of overall peak generating capacity that 
each needs in the winter and summer, respectively.56 Shurts’s 
case is persuasive and makes plain that the western North 
American electricity market became, through integration, 
much larger than Treaty negotiators envisioned in the 1950s 
and early 1960s.57 
Another reason why the calculation may no longer reflect 
50. Id. at 205. 
51. Carl Abbott, That Long Western Border: Canada, the United States, and a 
Century of Economic Change, in PARALLEL DESTINIES: CANADIAN-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS WEST OF THE ROCKIES, at 203, 212-13 (John M. Findlay and Ken S. Coats 
eds., 2002). 
52. See, Shurts, supra note 10, at 204-06, 213. 
53. Id. at 204. 
54. Id. at 205. 
55. Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly System, in THE END OF A 
NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER 
INDUSTRY 100 (Peter Z. Grossman and Daniel H. Cole eds., 2006); accord Shelly P. 
Battram and Reiner H. Lock, The Canada/United States Free-Trade Agreement and 
Trade in Energy, 9 ENERGY L. J. 327, 329 (1988). 
56. Shurts, supra note 10, at 205. 
57. Id. at 213. 
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the reality of how benefits and costs are shared—and which 
bolsters Shurts’s argument even if he makes mentions of it 
only in passing58—is the fact that such markets are also now 
not only integrated but liberalized. It is physically possible for 
power generated in rural British Columbia to be consumed in 
suburban San Diego and such a sale is protected by an 
international legal infrastructure of cross-border contracts59 
and multilateral trade agreements, discussed below. The 
facilitation of this trade by these laws may also have helped 
push the value of the Entitlement benefits higher than Treaty 
framers imagined.60 
Post-World War II British Columbia wanted the ability to 
sell power in American electricity markets and got it through 
the Treaty.61 But, because of the 1994 North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other changes in U.S. and 
Canadian utilities law, the province can still sell that power in 
the U.S. even if either the U.S. or Canadian federal 
government decides to terminate the Treaty. NAFTA, and the 
1987 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and 1994 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade it incorporated, guarantees 
utilities in the U.S. and Canada the ability to sell into each 
other’s markets.62 A U.S. desire for an integrated energy 
market was a driving force behind North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis63 and, 
as a result, its Chapter Six requires national treatment for 
energy and prohibits minimum or maximum import or export 
prices.64 
58. Id. at 210. 
59. Id. at 213. 
60. Unfortunately, a precise quantification of how much of the increase in value of 
the Entitlement is attributable to these new laws is not possible here. Much evidence 
exists, however, that there is usually a strong positive relationship between economic 
growth and the rule of law. That correlation is applicable here where the market 
became both bigger and safer for participants because contracts are given the extra 
enforcement protection of international trade agreements. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, 
THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2006); 
Order in the Jungle: Economics and the Rule of Law, ECONOMIST, March 13, 2008. 
61. Shurts, supra note 10, at 194. 
62. Yulia Selivanova, Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and 
Investment, in GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME 49, 66 
(Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte eds., 2010). 
63. John N. McDougall, DRIFTING TOGETHER: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CANADA-
U.S. INTEGRATION 144-45 (2006). 
64. Selivanova, supra note 62. 
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Just how far the limits of these protections extend is not yet 
clear. Academic commentators have pointed out that state 
renewable energy portfolio standards may not meet NAFTA 
obligations65 while private and public sector energy players on 
both sides of the 49th Parallel are proving increasingly willing 
to use the agreement to challenge regulations which they say 
discriminate against hydropower.66 What is apparent is that 
electricity itself, whether produced by a government or 
investor-owned utility, cannot be refused entry to either the 
U.S. or Canadian market based solely on the country, state, or 
province where it is generated. British Columbia no longer 
needs the Treaty to sell electricity in the U.S., and in fact 
makes this plain in its treaty review documents intended for 
the general public.67 
NAFTA, however, is by no means the only measure that 
creates a legal hedge around liberalized wholesale electricity 
markets and reinforces the increased value of power capable of 
being traded across western North America. Indeed, early 
commentators noted that NAFTA was in some ways redundant 
with the deregulation of North American electricity markets 
that started in the mid-1980s both between the U.S. and 
Canada and within each country.68 In the U.S., where the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its 
predecessors have had authority over interstate wholesale sale 
of electricity since passage of the 1935 Federal Power Act, 
65. Joe Walsh, NAFTA Ramifications of Hydropower Restrictions in the Waxman-
Markey Bill’s Proposed Renewable Portfolio Standard (Suffolk U. L. School Working 
Paper Series, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1417042; Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade 
Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs, 3 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 2, 29 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2135956. 
66. See, e.g., Nicole Mordant, Boone Pickens Challenges Canada on Green Power 
Law, REUTERS, Jul. 14, 2011, available at http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/ 
idCATRE76D65T20110714; BC Hydro Plays NAFTA Card in Bid to Win Green Status 
in California, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.canada.com/ 
story_print.html?id=6fe2c88a-304f-47dd-afd4-8f8d48145a40; Gordon Hamilton, Mercer 
International Seeks NAFTA Ruling on BC Hydro’s Electricity Policies, VANCOUVER 
SUN, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Mercer+ 
International+seeks+NAFTA+ruling+Hydro+electricity+pricing/6548987/story.html 
67. COLUMBIA BASIN TRUST, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (July 2013), available at http://www.cbt.org/crt/FAQ.html. 
68. G.C. Watkins, NAFTA and the Energy Sector: A Bridge Not Far Enough?, in 
ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS 191, 213 (Steven Globerman and Michael 
Walker eds., 1993). 
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liberalization was driven largely by Washington, D.C.69 The 
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) “jump-
started” wholesale competition and the growth of a new class 
of independent electricity generating firms through mandatory 
“wheeling.”70 This trend was furthered by Congress’s 
broadening of authority for FERC to require open-access 
transmission in the 1992 Energy Policy Act and 2005 
amendments to both that act and to PURPA.71 Deregulation 
was not exclusive to (or perhaps most successful in) the 
electricity industry, nor was it pioneered by the Carter and 
Reagan administrations that adopted Alfred Kahn’s ideas on 
changing the airline industry and eventually extended them to 
telecommunications, railroads, and energy.72 Margaret 
Thatcher’s government in the U.K. is generally regarded as the 
first to experiment in earnest with injecting competition into 
traditional natural monopoly industries (as well as to 
aggressively privatize government-owned enterprises, a trend 
that was not as widely attempted in North America).73 
In Canada, where individual provinces own their natural 
resources, Brian Mulroney’s federal government aggressively 
attempted energy deregulation starting in 1984.74 While this 
proved successful with petroleum, in the electricity sector it 
was the FERC’s gate-keeping of the U.S. market that 
ultimately compelled provincial deregulation of wholesale 
electricity. FERC’s Order No. 888 required liberalization of all 
utilities joining regional transmission organizations and 
selling into American markets, something that apparently 
proved more persuasive than Ottawa’s attempts to negotiate 
nationwide electricity deregulation.75 While this pattern did 
not play out in the Pacific Northwest as it did in other parts of 
North America,76 within the province, BC Hydro now allows 
69. Fred Bosselman et al., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (2006). 
70. Id. at 819, 821. 
71. Id. at 832-33. 
72. Richard F. Hirsh, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM, 226-27 (1999). 
73. See generally, Clint Bolick, Thatcher’s Revolution: Deregulation and Political 
Transformation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 527 (1995). 
74. G. Bruce Doern and Monica Gattinger, POWER SWITCH: ENERGY REGULATORY 
GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 32-34 (2003). 
75. Id. at 84-88. 
76. Walter R. Hall II et al., History, Objectives, and Mechanics of Competitive 
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wholesale access to all producers and choice of electricity 
supplier to industrial-size customers.77 
What does all this mean for a new Treaty? Most obviously, 
the changes affect what the U.S. and Canada want out of a 
new agreement and the value of what they realize under the 
existing one. Coupled with physical integration of British 
Columbia’s grid with the entire U.S. West Coast, legal 
protection of BC Hydro’s ability to sell electricity into the U.S. 
(and vice versa of U.S. electricity into British Columbia) makes 
the downstream power benefits more valuable than originally 
anticipated. 
Quantifying precisely the change in the value of the 
downstream power benefits from what was expected in the 
1960s to what they actually have evolved to in 2013 is less 
important than noting the direction and general magnitude of 
the change. Both seem to be up, though perhaps this is 
counterintuitive on first glance. Given that one of 
deregulation’s goals is to lower electricity prices,78 one might 
ask why deregulation has not lessened the value of Northwest 
hydropower. One reason is that western markets are larger not 
just because of population growth but also because they are 
both physically integrated and legally liberalized. A 2001 
study, for instance, found that NAFTA was not the only 
catalyst of change in the North American electricity industry 
but that NAFTA did have “significant and discernible effects 
on trade and investment flows in the electricity sector.”79 
Another reason is that in a liberalized wholesale market, 
responsive sources of electricity are more valuable than less 
responsive sources and hydropower is just such a responsive 
source.80 
The integration of western North America into a single 
Electricity Markets, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 1, 27 
(Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009). 
77. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY/OECD, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES: 
CANADA 2009 REVIEW 198 (2010). 
78. Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the 
United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31, 36 
(James M. Griffin and Steven L. Puller eds., 2005). 
79. Mary E. Kelly and Cyrus Reed, The CEC’s Trade and Environment Program: 
Cutting-Edge Analysis But Untapped Potential, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH 
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 101, 106 (David L. Markell 
and John H. Knox eds., 2003). 
80. Shurts, supra note 10, at 210. 
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wholesale electricity market makes hydropower more valuable. 
The liberalization of the international market through NAFTA 
and federal deregulation in both the U.S. and Canada at once 
enhance the value of this electricity and make protection of 
Canadian access to U.S. power markets in a new Columbia 
River Treaty superfluous. Both illustrate the importance of 
trends that could not be predicted a half century in the future 
and support the argument for a system that can be adapted 
more easily and more frequently. 
V. WHAT THEN SHOULD THE NEW CALCULATION BE? 
This Comment discusses principles that should be 
incorporated into a calculation, not a new equation 
methodology. There are several reasons. Mainly, the sort of 
elaborate, finely-tuned blend of scenario, sensitivity, and cost-
benefit analyses one can imagine using to choose a new 
Entitlement calculation methodology does not seem 
appropriate here. The BPA and USACE are already working 
on such an analysis and the value that a Comment of this 
scope can add seems limited; the report they already produced 
on how the Canadian portion of the Columbia hydropower 
system would function if the Treaty is terminated, for example, 
employs modeling at a level of specificity and sophistication 
that simply cannot be matched here.81 
Indeed, if this Comment were able to incorporate such a 
highly technical analysis, there would be a strong risk of losing 
sight of the proverbial forest for the trees. As one scholar 
discussing the relationship between environmental protection 
and electricity deregulation notes, the best “formula” for 
solving environmental law issues rooted in the economic 
problem of the commons requires not only calculations, but a 
“big picture” check to make sure that incentives are correctly 
aligned.82 BPA and USACE have done good, necessary work 
81. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, ASSESSING THE CANADIAN HYDRO 
OPERATION POST-2024 IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/Final_Report_No_Treaty_Canadian_ 
Operations.pdf. 
82. Victor B. Flatt, What Is the Best Formula to Protect the Environment in 
Electricity Restructuring? Comment on the Environmental Impacts of Electricity 
Restructuring by Karen Palmer and Dallas Burtraw, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. POL’Y J. 
225, 232-33 (2005). 
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but one also needs to keep perspective. The calculation 
methodology set up in the Treaty has itself, after all, always 
been complex yet it does not seem to produce durable 
accuracy.83 
Thus, the focus for this final section is on the principles and 
assumptions that should underpin any new methodology 
rather than steps on how to calculate it. Ultimately, given the 
way western electricity markets have changed in the past sixty 
years, it seems the best solution may be one that can employ 
flexibility to mimic the exchange between the U.S. and Canada 
in the market for water storage and coordination. 
It seems plain that both countries understand some sort of 
change to the Treaty system is coming, most likely including a 
downward revision in Entitlement payments. While some 
Canadians to date have hailed a new treaty as an opportunity 
to collaboratively work toward salmon restoration in British 
Columbia, for example, others bluntly predict the end of an 
annual fiscal windfall for the Province.84 
That the downstream energy distributed back to British 
Columbia to either consume itself or resell elsewhere in North 
America does not approximate the value of the energy actually 
generated in the U.S. is not really in dispute; the calculations 
are based on a hypothetical, optimal amount of generation that 
by law cannot include non-power and non-flood control 
considerations. There is disagreement on the value of the 
Entitlement itself, though this appears a smaller issue in large 
part because both the U.S. and Canada acknowledge that any 
estimate for future values depends in part on energy prices, 
which change by the minute. British Columbia quotes 
“Entitlement Revenue to B.C.” as between $100 million and  
$320 million annually from 2002 to 2012 while the BPA and 
USACE estimate annual “value to Canada” at between $200 
83. Jonathan A. Lesser, Resale of the Columbia River Treaty Downstream Benefits: 
One Road from Here to There, 30 NAT. RES. J. 609, 614 (1990). 
84. Mark Hume, Revised Columbia River Treaty Could Restore Salmon Runs, GLOBE 
AND MAIL, Aug. 14, 2013, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-
columbia/revised-columbia-river-treaty-could-restore-salmon-runs/article13749271; 
Becky Kramer, Treaty Renewal Chance to Reopen Salmon Passages, SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW, Sept. 26, 2013, available at http://www.spokesman.com/stories/ 
2013/sep/26/columbia-treaty-renewal-chance-to-reopen-salmon; Vaughn Palmer, B.C.’s 
Financial Honeymoon Ends With Columbia River Treaty Anniversary, VANCOUVER 
SUN, June 17, 2013, available at http://www.vancouversun.com/opinion/columnists/ 
Vaughn+Palmer+financial+honeymoon+ends+with+Columbia/8539063/story.html. 
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million and $350 million. 85 The major question, then, centers 
on the value of those non-power, non-flood benefits to the U.S. 
in relation to the amount paid to British Columbia through the 
Entitlement system. 
It may not surprise many that this is tricky to answer; 
several scholars have already addressed the difficulties posed 
by trying to use traditional cost-benefit analysis in both the 
electricity sector generally and the Columbia hydro system 
more specifically.86 BPA and USACE advocate a proxy for the 
Entitlement’s value based on the replacement cost of a gas-
generating resource that could produce an equivalent amount 
of energy.87 U.S. utilities are open to a traditional cost-benefits 
analysis method.88 The Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council, created by the 1980 Northwest Power Act, tracks fish 
and wildlife costs in terms of direct expenditures, capital 
investments, and foregone hydropower revenue.89 
The British Columbia (perhaps not surprisingly) argues that 
this value is higher than does the U.S. Entity, hinting perhaps 
that Entitlement payments capture the price tag that the U.S. 
puts on those non-power and non-flood benefits: “B.C. believes 
that coordinated water flows, made possible because of B.C. 
water storage facilities, provides a value to the U.S. whether it 
is used for salmon protection, power generation or other 
economic, social and environmental benefits.”90 And if one 
85. PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVIEW 
ENEWSLETTER UPDATE - TREATY REVIEW QUESTION OF THE MONTH: DECEMBER (Dec. 
2012), available at https://www.enewsletters.gov.bc.ca/Columbia_River_Treaty_ 
Review_eNewsletter/December_2012/Canadian_Entitlement/article; U.S. ENTITY, 
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY INITIAL REPORT KICKS OFF PUBLIC PROCESS (July 2010), 
available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/Columbia%20River%20Treaty 
%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20report%20kickoff.pdf. 
86. See Olivia Odom, Note, Energy v. Water, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 353 (2012); see also 
Nancy K. Kubasek and Chaz A. Giles, Dammed to be Divided: Resolving the 
Controversy Over the Destruction of the Snake River Dams and Providing a Model for 
Future Decision-Making, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y R. 675 (2001). 
87. U.S. ENTITY, supra note 6. 
88. Letter from the Columbia River Treaty Power Grp. to Stephen Oliver, U.S. 
Entity Coordinator, Bonneville Power Administration and to Mr. David Ponganis, U.S. 
Entity Coordinator, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter CRT 
Power Group Letter]. 
89. NORTHWEST POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, 2012 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 
FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM COSTS REPORT: 12TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
NORTHWEST GOVERNORS (May 2013), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/media/ 
6867139/2013-04.pdf. 
90. PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, supra note 85; accord PROVINCE OF BRITISH 
                                               
 
21
Kirkpatrick: The Columbia River Treaty's Canadian Entitlement: The Role of Lib
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013
2013] THE CANADIAN ENTITLEMENT 341 
thinks of Canada as producer and the U.S. as consumer, from 
the perspective of Paul Samuelson’s revealed preference 
theory,91 there is some merit to this position: the fact that the 
U.S. has already chosen among alternative uses of what it 
buys means it has assigned a value to those non-power and 
non-flood control uses. 
Even if one accepts Samuelson’s theory of consumer 
behavior, however, it is probably apparent that its application 
to this situation quickly becomes overly simplistic. Namely, the 
Treaty does not conform to the conditions Samuelson 
established as necessary for revealed preference to work. The 
U.S. and Canada are not buyer and seller in a perfectly 
competitive market, they are two nations who signed a treaty 
under specific political circumstances in the 1960s and are 
constrained through at least 2024 by the regime set up in that 
document. Others who have examined hydroelectric dams on 
the Columbia in the context of non-power benefits point out, 
similarly, that there is a critical distinction in cost-benefit 
methodology between willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept,92 a fact that casts more doubt on the notion that the 
U.S. has already assigned long-term value to non-power, non-
flood control benefits of coordinated river flows by choosing to 
manage the Columbia as it does while paying the Entitlement. 
Should, then, the U.S. and Canada attempt to hammer out a 
new calculation methodology that tries to estimate the value of 
non-power and flood benefits, acknowledging that payment 
from such a calculation will likely be substantially lower than 
the current Entitlement? That is certainly one option and 
something that U.S. groups most opposed to the current 
Entitlement calculation—the so-called “Mid-Columbia 
utilities”—appear willing to accept politically, provided they 
and their ratepayer customers are not directly saddled with 
COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINES, U.S. BENEFITS FROM THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER TREATY—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PERSPECTIVE (June 25, 2013), available at http://blog.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/ 
files/2012/07/US-Benefits-from-CRT-June-20-13-2.pdf. 
91. Paul Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour, 5 
ECONOMICA 61 (1938). The theory holds (in brief) that the best measure of a 
consumer’s preference is the consumer’s purchasing behavior. 
92. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. and Linda J. Graham, The Role of Rights in Benefit Cost 
Methodology: The Example of Salmon and Hydroelectric Dams, 74 WASH. L. REV. 763 
(1999). 
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new environmental mitigation costs.93 This consortium of 
Pacific Northwest utilities advocates either termination of the 
Treaty or an Entitlement based on actual incremental power 
benefits,94 including especially the value of that power if sold 
outside the Pacific Northwest. A similar though less strident 
criticism of the Entitlement enjoys support from some with 
fewer direct financial interests in the formula who nonetheless 
see the present calculation as outmoded: 
[A]ctual dam operations are now so heavily determined 
by non-power considerations, that to determine power 
benefits as if an entire project operating purpose (not 
present in 1960) did not now exist is silly. That does not 
mean the relative values realized by the countries are 
wrong or must change, just that the method of 
determining benefits is unrealistic.95 
If the two countries can negotiate such a calculation, at least 
in the short run doing so could prove a more seamless 
transition than going without the Treaty “cold turkey” and 
risking major disruptions, forecast and unforeseen, to a system 
upon which so many depend. 
But one theme that emerges from much of the literature on 
the Treaty is the need for a much more flexible mechanism, 
perhaps suggesting that a reconfigured Entitlement is not the 
best way to determine how British Columbia should be 
compensated. Shurts concludes his essay by reflecting on the 
need for shorter forecast horizons because of uncertainty and 
flexibility96 while others discuss uncertainty, resilience97 and 
adaptability.98 Looking more broadly at electricity networks 
and markets worldwide, “innovation,” one set of scholars 
remarks, “permeates the entire field.”99 Indeed, flexibility is 
93. CRT Power Group Letter, supra note 88. 
94. Id. 
95. Shurts, supra note 10, at 223; accord John M. Hyde, Columbia River Treaty Past 
and Future, HYDROVISION 1, 21 (July 2010); accord Tom Karier, What Needs to Change 
in the Columbia River Treaty, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, available at 
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2021546101_tomkarieroped06xml.html. 
96. Shurts, supra note 10, at 244. 
97. Gregory Hill et al., Uncertainty, Society and Resilience: A Case Study in the 
Columbia River Basin, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED 333. 
98. Craig W. Thomas, The Impact of Institutional Design on the Adaptability of 
Governing Institutions: Implications for Transboundary River Governance, in THE 
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED 398. 
99. Martha M. Roggenkamp et al., The Role of Networks in Changing Energy 
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itself a principle advocated by BPA and USACE in their draft 
treaty recommendation,100 perhaps a recognition that benefits 
sharing mechanism needs to be based on something other than 
just a traditional capital budgeting timeline for a dam. 
Some have proposed that flexibility could be facilitated 
through a transboundary water-management organization 
similar to the Great Lakes Commission.101 Others, however, 
object to the very notion of trying to coordinate ecological 
management internationally as an unneeded additional layer 
of coordination and expense.102 
If one of the problems with the Entitlement calculation is 
that its distribution of financial costs and benefits differ 
greatly from those of the market, perhaps one solution is to 
begin thinking about how to structure a mechanism so that the 
U.S.-Canada buyer-seller relationship can more closely 
approximate the market conditions of Samuelson’s theory of 
consumer behavior. Change is something markets (if correctly 
designed) manage well. It would prove foolish, of course, to try 
to impose such a model too literally: storage and management 
of water flow for wildlife protection on the Columbia is not a 
product that could ever be sold in a perfectly competitive spot 
market; the product is unique, there is only one buyer and one 
seller, and the two countries are not rational consumers in an 
economic model. While without doubt similar and closely 
linked culturally as well as economically and geographically,103 
the U.S. and Canada are two nations with their own 
sometimes-idiosyncratic sets of laws and politics that shape 
attitudes about energy management,104 not generic rational 
Markets and the Need for Innovative Solutions, in ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE LAW: 
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS IN CHANGING MARKETS 436 (Martha M. Roggenkamp et al 
eds., 2012). 
100. U.S. ENTITY, supra note 6. 
101. Scott McKenzie, A River Runs Through It: The Future of the Columbia River 
Treaty, Water Rights, Development, and Climate Change, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 921, 
950 (2013). 
102. CRT Power Group Letter, supra note 93. 
103. See, e.g., Michael D. Behiels and Reginald C. Stuart, Introduction: Forging a 
New American Continent; Transnational Theories and Studies, in TRANSNATIONALISM: 
CANADA-UNITED STATES HISTORY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (Michael D. Behiels and 
Reginald C. Stuart eds., 2010). 
104. See, e.g., Eric M. Uslaner, Energy Policy and Federalism in the U.S. and 
Canada, in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION 41 (Jonathan Lemco ed., 1992). 
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actors in a market. 
Further, one only needs to look to Enron’s much-cited 
gaming of the deregulated California retail electricity market 
in 2000–2001 to understand that market mechanisms have 
limitations in a society dependent on electricity.105 And one 
should not forget that market integration was made possible 
not just by liberalization, but also significant government 
investment in transmission infrastructure, a condition that 
some argue is essential for any restructured energy market to 
succeed.106 Still, attempting to find a model that infuses some 
principles of a market scenario where buyers and sellers 
determine the value of goods in real time may help avoid the 
calcification of assumptions that nettles many under the 
existing Entitlement calculation. Even setting up the formula 
for downstream benefits sharing as something which could be 
revised as often as every few years could help this “market” 
between the U.S. and Canada better align costs and benefits in 
both nations. 
If there is a new calculation instead of some other 
mechanism, it needs to incorporate costs of wildlife 
management, sync payments as closely as possible to an actual 
rather than hypothetical measurement of the energy 
transmitted from U.S. dams, and reflect the fact that the value 
of energy generated on the Columbia changes constantly in a 
market composed not just of Washington, Oregon and British 
Columbia but most of western North America. Even a solid, 
sophisticated approach to reforming the calculation like one 
proposed in the 1990s will not work if it does not incorporate 
the impact of energy prices outside the Pacific Northwest and 
the fact that this large wholesale market enjoys solid legal 
protections.107 
Such a solution is admittedly only partially developed and 
leaves much out. Perhaps most glaringly, the U.S. must still 
face its long-standing and often heated internal conflict 
between optimal power generation and optimal fish 
105. Shurts, supra note 10, at 213; accord Jim Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND 
PUBLIC LAW (2005). 
106. Thomas-Olivier Léautier, Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for 
Power, 19 J. REGULATORY ECON. 27 (2001); accord William W. Hogan, Electricity is a 
Federal Issue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2003. 
107. See Lesser, supra note 83, at 620. 
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protection;108 it seems plain that there is a tradeoff between 
fish and power and a better downstream benefits system will 
probably not end the “water wars.” This Comment does not 
debate how different benefits should be prioritized or what 
their relative values are but, rather, takes the position that 
payment to satisfy those environmental requirements needs to 
be explicitly broken out and constantly reevaluated in order for 
payments to British Columbia to reflect what is actually 
driving management of the river. The U.S. should not just 
calculate flood and power benefits for the Pacific Northwest if 
what it is really buying is timing of water flows for agricultural 
use, recreation, navigation, fish protection, and electricity 
generated on the Columbia and marketed across half a 
continent. 
If there is to be a new treaty and with it something 
analogous to the Entitlement, the shapers of that new 
mechanism ought to consider not only new environmental laws 
but also new realities about how electricity is regulated, 
managed, and marketed in the U.S. and Canada. Integration 
and liberalization of western electricity markets in particular 
helped give the Canadian Entitlement a value very different in 
financial terms from what drafters of the calculation 
envisioned. That vast divergence itself lends support to calls 
for a new Columbia River downstream benefits compensation 
system that is not only re-balanced for 2013, but flexible and 
adaptable for future adjustments—a system perhaps built on 
principles like those underlying the freer and more integrated 
energy markets which helped sustain and grow the 
Entitlement’s current value. 
108. See, e.g., Melinda Kassen and Jack E. Williams, Energy, Water, and the Natural 
Environment, in THE WATER-ENERGY NEXUS IN THE AMERICAN WEST 18, 27 (Douglas 
S. Kenney and Robert Wilkinson eds., 2011). 
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